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OPENING PANDORA’S JURY BOX
B. Samantha Helgason*
More than sixty years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Remmer v.
United States, thereby defining what procedural steps restore a defendant’s
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial in the face of a contaminated or partial
jury. Remmer, a case replete with evidence of jury tampering and covert
investigations, fashioned the remedy for future courts to redress allegations
of jury taint. Upon making out a prima facie case, a defendant is entitled to
an evidentiary hearing, at which the evidence is presumed to prejudice the
defendant, and the government bears the burden of rebutting. In Remmer’s
wake, however, the Court issued two subsequent opinions that some circuits
have interpreted to obviate the presumption of prejudice and restrict
Remmer’s rule.
This Note observes the inconsistent effects of the current circuit split on
defendants’ rights at trial, and it contends that the disparity will increase as
technology dissolves access barriers between jurors and outside information.
This Note examines where Supreme Court jurisprudence, circuit procedure,
and habeas corpus doctrine have shaped the current circuit split. It then
proposes that circuits can mend the split and pave a unified path forward by
reframing their analyses to include three additional considerations. Further,
by separating allegations of jury taint into three subcategories, circuits can
renew Remmer’s pretechnology rule to properly address jury taint in a
digital age.
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INTRODUCTION
Insulating juries from outside influence has long challenged courts.1
Judges rely on procedural safeguards, and they trust jurors to uphold the oath
sworn upon induction into the jury box. Yet, despite agreement on the
various procedural tools that protect jurors from outside influence, courts
frequently disagree over what procedures properly sanitize a jury once it has
been contaminated.
Over the last fifteen years, courts have noted the rise of the “Google
mistrial”—a result of jurors conducting outside research during trials they

1. “Any judge who has sat with juries knows that in spite of forms they are extremely
likely to be impregnated by the environing atmosphere.” Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 349
(1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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observe.2 In 2009, a juror in a federal drug trial3 caused the judge to declare
a mistrial after he admitted to having researched the ongoing case online.4
The defendant stood trial for eight weeks, fighting charges for the sale of
Both the federal
prescription drugs through internet pharmacies.5
prosecutors and the defense attorneys had poured countless hours and costs
into preparing, trying, and defending the case.6 After the parties had
concluded their arguments and sent the jury to begin its deliberations, one of
the jurors approached the judge and informed him that another juror had both
conducted online research during the trial and shared the results with the
other jurors.7
While questioning the juror, the judge learned the juror had uncovered
evidence that the court had specifically excluded from the proceedings.8 In
questioning the jury as a whole, the judge then learned that eight additional
jurors had also conducted outside research online.9 They admitted to
combing through Google for coverage about the case, searching for the
lawyers and the defendant, looking for outside evidence, and using
Wikipedia to define legal terms.10 When asked why, one juror responded,
“Well, I was curious.”11 One of the defense attorneys was admittedly
stunned, describing it as a heartbreak and noting this as the “first time modern
technology [had] struck us in that fashion.”12
While this case depicts an obvious waste of time, money, and court
resources, the judge was able to cure a potential miscarriage of justice by
declaring a mistrial.13 But what happens when jurors are less candid or
forthcoming with the judge? In a separate case around the same time, the
media reported on a different defendant’s trial in another part of the
country.14 A juror admitted to fellow juror Seth McDowell that she had run
a Google search on the defendant despite the court’s explicit instructions not
to.15 McDowell said he considered informing the judge, but he then
dismissed the thought and wrapped up the remainder of his jury duty.16 The

2. John Schwartz, As Jurors Turn to Web, Mistrials Are Popping Up, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
17, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/18/us/18juries.html [https://perma.cc/RA38UU43].
3. United States v. Hernandez, No. 07-60027-CR (S.D. Fla. defendant’s motion for
mistrial granted Mar. 10, 2009).
4. Schwartz, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
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trial concluded after only two days, and McDowell later confessed that it may
have lasted much longer had “everybody d[one] the right thing.”17
Courts have long sought to protect jurors from third-party interference.18
And while this threat surely exists, courts largely agree on how to address
tampering.19 Now, advancements in technology introduce new threats to jury
impartiality.20 The immediacy with which jurors may examine a wealth of
information at their fingertips makes them prone to misconduct.21 Jurors are
already accustomed to researching and verifying information before
committing to decisions in their private lives.22 Then, as jurors, they want to
feel especially informed given the life-altering impacts of their decisions.23
Consequently, this tendency permits smart devices to infiltrate proceedings
as Trojan horses—silent sources of outside information resting within each
juror’s pocket.24
In an atmosphere where courts require full control over the type and
quantity of information their jurors consume, such quick and easy access to
the outside world creates a rampant problem.25 This threat becomes even
more apparent as courts contemplate how to rely on technology. For
instance, in 2020, many courts have had to consider whether to conduct
virtual criminal proceedings during the COVID-19 pandemic.26 Without an
ability to gather jurors in person, courts now question what mechanisms, if
any, can properly insulate and monitor a jury.27
This Note28 explores the myriad of ways in which federal circuit courts
have identified and redressed evolving instances of taint since the U.S.
Supreme Court’s initial decision in Remmer v. United States.29 Circuits have
interpreted Supreme Court precedent to create procedure for situations in
which outside influences may prejudice a verdict. Part I defines the role of
17. Id.
18. See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1892) (describing potential
prejudice from a jury’s exposure to third parties), abrogated by Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,
137 S. Ct. 855 (2017); Wheaton v. United States, 133 F.2d 522, 527 (8th Cir. 1943) (“The law
is that communications, relative to a case on trial, between jurors and third persons, or
witnesses, or the officer in charge of the jury, are absolutely forbidden . . . .”).
19. See infra Parts II.A, II.B.2 (discussing Remmer’s progeny).
20. Claire C. Kates, Protecting the Impartial Jury: A Solution of Questions, 35 ST. LOUIS
U. PUB. L. REV. 415, 423 (2016).
21. Id. at 423–26.
22. Roy Futterman, Perspective, Are We Driving Jurors to the Internet?, BLOOMBERG L.
(Aug. 10, 2016, 1:51 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/are-wedriving-jurors-to-the-internet-perspective [https://perma.cc/G74L-9S3K].
23. Id.
24. See AM. BAR ASS’N JUD. DIV. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE TRIAL JUDGES, A FAIR TRIAL:
JURORS USE OF DEVICES AND THE INTERNET 4 (2010), https://www.ncsc.org/__data/
assets/pdf_file/0026/13769/fairtrialhandbookauthcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3AMUMPEP].
25. See id.; Futterman, supra note 22.
26. See infra Part III.D (discussing the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on jury trials).
27. See infra Part III.D.
28. This Note addresses cases at different stages of the appeals process. To maintain
consistency throughout, this Note refers to the accused as “defendant” or “habeas petitioner.”
29. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
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the jury, discusses its importance in preserving the constitutionality of trials,
and assesses the varying degrees to which presumptions may define
procedure. Part I also examines the seminal Supreme Court cases that have
delineated such procedures. Part II then reviews how circuits have
interpreted those holdings to allocate procedural entitlements and burdens to
litigants, further noting where habeas procedure complicates courts’ analyses
and exacerbates the underlying disagreement. Part III argues that circuits
evaluate allegations of jury taint through narrow lenses, ignoring three
important considerations that would otherwise harmonize Supreme Court
case law. It offers alternate subcategories for how courts should consider
jury taint in the face of advancing technology. This Note concludes that
reading the Supreme Court cases together best equips courts to confront jury
taint in the digital era.
I. DEFINING THE RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY
This part first explores Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, focusing in turn
on the establishment of an impartial jury and the use of presumptions. It then
reviews how Supreme Court case law laid the foundation for redressing
extraneous influence on juries.
A. The Sixth Amendment and the Role of a Jury
The Sixth Amendment guarantees each criminal defendant in a federal
proceeding the constitutional right to trial “by an impartial jury.”30 The
Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause incorporated the Sixth
Amendment’s protections against the states, giving both state and federal
criminal defendants the same right to fair proceedings before an impartial
jury.31 As such, the jury is a cornerstone of the American legal system.32
Since this country’s founding, the judiciary has entrusted juries to find
facts and come to conclusions by applying the appropriate law to those
facts.33 Jurors must remain impartial, valuing their life experiences on one
hand and acting as “blank slates” on which litigants paint the case’s facts and

30. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. However, the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial does not
extend to petty criminal offenses. James L. Buchwalter, Annotation, Construction and
Application of Sixth Amendment Right to Trial by Jury—Supreme Court Cases, 6 A.L.R. Fed.
2d 213 § 5 (2005).
31. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
32. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., HANDBOOK FOR TRIAL JURORS SERVING IN THE UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURTS
15
(2019)
http://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/jury/
jurortrialhandbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3JT-UGQX] (“The effectiveness of the democratic
system itself is largely measured by the integrity, the intelligence, and the general quality of
citizenship of the jurors who serve in our courts.”).
33. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 514 (1995) (“[T]he jury, aided by the court
must judge . . . . [And] hav[ing] now heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case[,]
[t]hey will apply that law to the facts, and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their
own consciences may direct.” (alternation in original) (quoting Sparf v. United States, 156
U.S. 51, 67 (1895))).
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law on the other.34 Because the jury is integral to the legal system, courts go
to great lengths to protect the privacy, even the sanctity, of the jury box.35
During the initial stages of their duty,36 jurors swear or affirm an oath to
decide a case based solely upon the law and evidence presented at trial.37
The jurors are purposefully insulated through this process to position a
presiding judge as the only permissible source of information.38 A court both
supplies a jury with the applicable law and selects what evidence the jury
may consider.39
Further, jurors swear to disregard their personal prejudices and to return
verdicts according to their best judgment.40 They may draw upon
experience, common sense, and common knowledge, but they may not rely
on outside sources of information.41 Jurors who do learn outside information
or who are approached by third parties seeking to influence the proceedings
must inform the court.42 Jurors may also not communicate in person or
electronically about the case,43 prematurely deliberate,44 or read45 or listen
to information regarding the case.46
Even still, outside influence occasionally pierces the procedural walls
designed to shield the jury box.47 Jurors may taint the proceedings through
their own actions.48 These actions include reaching out to third parties,
conducting outside research, testing the evidence, defining legal terms
through outside means, making untruthful statements during voir dire,
broadcasting confidential information from the proceedings to the general
34. Richard Lorren Jolly, The New Impartial Jury Mandate, 117 MICH. L. REV. 713, 715
(2019); see also JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 12 (“The words of Supreme Court
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes from over a century ago apply with equal force to jurors
serving in this advanced technological age: ‘The theory of our system is that the conclusions
to be reached in a case will be induced only by evidence and argument in open court, and not
by any outside influence, whether of private talk or public print.’” (quoting Patterson v.
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907))).
35. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing each circuit’s procedure for redressing threats of
extraneous influence); see also Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987) (“[T]he
impartiality of the adjudicator goes to the very integrity of the legal system.”).
36. This Note will not discuss the creation of grand jury panels, decisions to indict,
arraignments, or other procedural steps preceding criminal trials. It further assumes
familiarity with initial voir dire examinations and jury selection.
37. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 8.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 11.
41. Id.; see also Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
42. JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., supra note 32, at 11, 13.
43. Id. at 11–12 (explicitly listing communications and social networking “on computers,
netbooks, tablets, and smart phones” and “any” internet service or “instant messaging service,
RSS feed, or other automatic alert that may transmit information regarding the case to the
juror; or any Internet chat room, blog, or website”).
44. Id. at 11.
45. Id. (prohibiting newspapers, dictionaries, and reference materials both electronic and
paper).
46. Id. (instructing jurors to “avoid radio, television, and Internet broadcasts”).
47. See infra Parts II.A–B (giving case examples).
48. E.g., supra notes 2–17 and accompanying text.
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public, or deliberating with other jurors prematurely.49 Alternatively, they
may fall victim to third-party interference. These actions include outside
efforts to tamper with the jury by threat, suggestion, or bribery, and they
encompass accidental forms of influence like media coverage or newspaper
headlines that bleed into jurors’ daily routines.50 Regardless of the form,
extraneous information has the potential to infect a jury and infringe on a
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.51
Where it does, the question becomes: To what extent has outside contact
violated that defendant’s rights?52 Has the transgression stepped on the
defendant’s right to due process?53 Did it strike the heart of the Sixth
Amendment?54 To answer these questions, courts pivot to identify the source
of intrusion and to understand its impact on jurors and their verdicts.55
B. Balance Through Presumptions
One way courts may counteract the potential impact of outside information
is to implement a presumption.56 A rebuttable presumption is an assumption
of fact that courts accept as true until an opposing party contests it.57 Rather
than proving a fact outright, litigants presume a fact by relying on
circumstantial evidence that creates a reasonable belief that a probable chain
of events occurred.58 Where a court grants one party a presumption, the
opposing party bears the burden of producing evidence to rebut.59 In the
absence of such evidence, the opposing party fails to carry its burden of
production, and the presumption stands.60 However, where that party
satisfies its burden of production, it overcomes and voids the presumption.61

49. Timothy J. Fallon, Mistrial in 140 Characters or Less?: How the Internet and Social
Networking Are Undermining the American Jury System and What Can Be Done to Fix It, 38
HOFSTRA L. REV. 935, 938–43 (2010); Bennett L. Gershman, Contaminating the Verdict: The
Problem of Juror Misconduct, 50 S.D. L. REV. 322, 324 (2005).
50. See Gershman, supra note 49, at 328–39.
51. See United States v. Blagojevich, 743 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (N.D. Ill. 2010) (discussing
how attempts to communicate with jurors endanger a defendant’s right to a fair trial).
52. See infra Part I.C (explaining the creation of a Remmer hearing, by which courts may
explore the impact of outside influence on the verdict).
53. See generally Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982) (differentiating between the
remedies for due process and for Sixth Amendment violations).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Cf. Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 378–79 (2010) (positing that the point at
which media coverage and publicity influence jurors’ ability to remain impartial is a case-bycase determination).
57. Rebuttable Presumption Law and Legal Definition, U.S. LEGAL,
https://definitions.uslegal.com/r/rebuttable-presumption [https://perma.cc/M8E4-4HV4] (last
visited June 22, 2020).
58. Paul F. Rothstein, Demystifying Burdens of Proof and the Effect of Rebuttable
Evidentiary Presumptions in Civil and Criminal Trials 3 (Oct. 11, 2017) (unpublished
manuscript), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3050687 [https://perma.cc/83MR-44DA].
59. Id. at 65.
60. Id.
61. Id.

238

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

Jurisdictions rely on underlying policies, rationale, and judicial discretion
to develop a presumption’s ultimate force.62 As presumptions come from a
society’s shared assumptions about how the world works, the extent to which
a society accepts something as true influences that presumption’s force.63 A
court then molds the rigor of a presumption’s legal effect by assigning
different evidentiary burdens to the litigants.64
In the criminal context, presumptions already shape how the law attributes
rights to the accused and how to conduct trials. Perhaps most commonly
recognized, defendants are presumed innocent until proven guilty.65 The
government bears the burden of putting forth evidence sufficient to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and only a showing of that caliber can
overcome the presumption of innocence.66 Similarly, juries are presumed to
be impartial.67 The challenger—usually the accused—bears the initial
burden of demonstrating partiality to overcome a presumption of
impartiality.68
The presumption of prejudice, which this Note examines in detail, arises
once outside influence is alleged to have reached the jury.69 As a jury may
strip the accused of life or liberty, ensuring juror impartiality is paramount.70
In response, instating a presumption of prejudice acts to restore balance to
potentially partial proceedings.71 It serves to safeguard a defendant’s
fundamental right to a fair trial.72
C. Supreme Court History
This section explores the trilogy of cases that established the framework
through which courts redress credible allegations of jury taint. It then turns
to explain per se prejudice, which defines the upper limit of presumed
prejudice. Taken together, these cases have built the legal sandbox in which
courts confronting potentially contaminated juries begin their analyses.

62. See id. at 21–22.
63. Id. at 17 n.35. For example, society presumes that upon mailing a letter, and not
having seen it returned, that letter arrived safely to its recipient. The high probability of proper
mailing resulting in arrival informs society’s common experience and common sense. It
becomes a safe assumption. Id.
64. Id. at 21.
65. The presumption of innocence first took shape in Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S.
664, 682 (1896).
66. Id.
67. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722–23 (1961).
68. Id. at 723; see, e.g., Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 247–51 (1910) (alleging juror
partiality); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1879) (same).
69. See infra Parts I.C.1–2, II.
70. See Irvin, 366 U.S. at 722.
71. See Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (requiring the government to
proffer evidence that rebuts a presumption of prejudice).
72. See infra Parts I.C.1–2.
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1. Three Foundational Cases
The 1954 Supreme Court case Remmer v. United States established that
extrajudicial communication with a jury merits an evidentiary hearing at
which all parties may gather to determine the extent of harm to a defendant’s
trial.73 In Remmer, an unnamed person approached a juror, who would later
become the jury foreman, and suggested that the juror could profit if he
delivered a verdict favorable to the defendant.74 The juror reported this
interaction to the judge, who conferred with the prosecuting attorneys prior
to their opening an FBI investigation.75 The FBI then conducted its
investigation only to conclude that the third party’s comment was made in
jest and did not pose a threat to the ongoing trial.76
However, throughout the process, neither the judge nor the prosecuting
attorneys had informed defense counsel of the incident or ongoing
investigation.77 In fact, defense counsel first learned of the ex parte
exchanges from reading a newspaper article after his client had been
convicted.78 Subsequently, the defendant moved for a new trial and
requested a hearing to examine whether the incident had deprived him of a
fair trial.79
The trial court denied the defendant’s request for a hearing, after which the
defendant appealed his case up to the Supreme Court.80 The Court explained
the following standard, incidentally laying the foundation on which circuits
have disagreed for decades:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering,
directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending
before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial,
if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions
and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the
parties.81

Thus, the Court established that a defendant’s prima facie showing of jury
taint minimally entitles him to an evidentiary hearing.82 As the trial court in
Remmer had not yet convened a hearing, the Court could not discern what
events had transpired or whether the alleged incidents had in fact harmed the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.83 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment

73. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30.
74. Id. at 228.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 228–29.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 229.
80. Id. at 229–30.
81. Id. at 229.
82. Jesse Gessin, Bit by Bit: Breaking Down the Ninth Circuit’s Frameworks for Jury
Misconduct in the Digital Age, 18 NEV. L.J. 709, 714 (2018) (noting the creation of evidentiary
hearings known as “Remmer hearings”).
83. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
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against the defendant with instructions to convene a hearing to discern the
harm.84
Tucked within this holding lingers the question of whether the defendant’s
prima facie showing of jury taint also entitles him to a presumption of
prejudice at the evidentiary hearing.85 The Remmer Court found the
extrajudicial contact to be “presumptively prejudicial,” and it charged the
government with showing harmlessness.86 That is, the defendant’s prima
facie showing shifted the burden to the government to produce evidence.
Unless the government could demonstrate that the third party’s comments
had not harmed the jury’s verdict, the Court would presume that the contact
had prejudiced the trial and would vacate the conviction.
In Remmer’s wake, however, circuit courts have construed the following
two Supreme Court cases to cloud or even overturn the rule promulgated in
Remmer. First, in Smith v. Phillips,87 the Court denied a defendant’s petition
for a writ of habeas corpus, reasoning that the defendant’s claim of juror
partiality was insufficient to merit a new trial.88 In this case, one of the jurors
had applied for employment with the District Attorney’s Office, but neither
the trial court nor defense counsel had learned of the juror’s application until
after the jury had returned its guilty verdict.89 Justice William Rehnquist,
writing for the Court, explained that “the remedy for allegations of juror
partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the opportunity to prove
actual bias.”90 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, recognizing that the majority’s
view might prove too absolute, concurred to explain that the Court’s opinion
here would not foreclose the use of implied bias in all instances.91
Eleven years later, the Court returned to Remmer’s rule again in United
States v. Olano.92 Here, the trial court allowed two alternate jurors to observe
jury deliberations.93 On appeal, the defendant contended that the alternate
jurors’ presence during deliberations had undermined their ability to be
impartial.94 Justice O’Connor, this time writing for the Court, reiterated a
similar standard to the one she had espoused in her concurrence in Phillips.95
She departed from the focus on presumptions, and she instead encouraged
courts to ask whether the intrusion influenced the ultimate verdict.96 Not
84. Id. at 230.
85. Id. at 229.
86. Id.
87. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
88. Id. at 217 (asserting that a ruling in the defendant’s favor would render “few trials . . .
constitutionally acceptable” as “it is virtually impossible to shield jurors” from every potential
influence).
89. Id. at 212–13.
90. Id. at 215 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 224 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
92. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
93. Id. at 729–30.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 738–39; see also Phillips, 455 U.S. at 223 (discussing judicial discretion).
96. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739 (“[B]ut a presumption of prejudice as opposed to a specific
analysis does not change the ultimate inquiry: Did the intrusion affect the jury’s deliberations
and thereby its verdict?”).
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every case should presume prejudice, and the presence of alternate jurors did
not entail a “sufficient risk” of harm to justify such a presumption.97 Thus,
Olano established that only certain types of taint may trigger a presumption
of prejudice, and courts should investigate how the intrusion influenced the
verdict prior to granting one.98
2. Defining Per Se Prejudice
During the years between Remmer and Phillips, the Court also defined the
kind of contact that per se prejudices a defendant.99 Where jury taint
definitively prejudices the defendant, as in these two cases below, a court
need not grapple with Remmer’s line of cases. On its face, the contact has
impaired the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights and merits reversal. Thus,
the following two holdings structure the boundary between contact that
presumptively prejudices and per se prejudices a verdict.
In Turner v. Louisiana,100 two deputy sheriffs who served as principal
witnesses for the prosecution simultaneously supervised the jury,
transporting the jurors between meals and lodging each day.101 In Parker v.
Gladden,102 the bailiff responsible for marshaling the jury declared his belief
to one juror that the defendant was guilty and wicked.103
In both cases, the Court identified the official character of the deputy
sheriffs and bailiff as capable of greatly influencing a jury’s perception.104
Both the deputies and the bailiff were responsible for protecting and escorting
the jury—a role that inherently garners trust and confidence. The Court
determined that such association with jurors, especially where positioned to
foster rapport prior to jury deliberations, had infected the jurors with
prejudice sufficient to reverse those convictions.105 Accordingly, Remmer’s
presumption did not apply to per se instances of taint. The presumption

97. Id. at 741. Some circuits have perceived this as Justice O’Connor seemingly
substituting judicial guardrails for procedure and calling on courts to use their experience to
discern when to apply the presumption. See, e.g., United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 225–
26 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 1995).
98. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737; see also United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 642 (4th
Cir. 2012) (interpreting Olano as framing the inquiry as either a Remmer presumption or as “a
specific analysis”).
99. See generally Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
466 (1965).
100. 379 U.S. 466 (1965).
101. Id. at 467–68.
102. 385 U.S. 363 (1966).
103. Id. at 363.
104. See id. at 365 (finding that the bailiff’s role “as an officer of the court as well as the
State” weighed greatly with the jury); Turner, 379 U.S. at 474 (describing the association with
the jury as “even more prejudicial” since they were deputies).
105. Parker, 385 U.S. at 365–66; Turner, 379 U.S. at 472, 474. Justice John Marshall
Harlan dissented in Parker, categorizing the bailiff’s commentary as “no more than
inconsequential incidents in an otherwise constitutionally flawless proceeding.” Parker, 385
U.S. at 369. His dissent highlights the brewing tension over what calculus of prejudice
conclusively strips a defendant of a fair trial. See id.
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instead lives in the murky space between per se prejudice and harmless
contact.
Ultimately, the sporadic handful of Supreme Court cases on this matter
have confused circuits about what contact to presume prejudicial and by
which standard to evaluate alleged taint. Circuits have therefore diverged in
their interpretations of Remmer’s presumption. While they agree that a prima
facie showing entitles a defendant to a hearing, Remmer left unanswered
whether that showing presumes prejudice and reallocates the burden of proof
to the government.106 The perceived ambiguity of, first, whether Remmer
created a burden-shifting framework and, second, whether the subsequent
cases dissolved its standard has challenged courts for years.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND PROCEDURAL OVERLAY
This part observes how circuit courts have grappled with Remmer’s
presumption and whether to apply it or one of its successors’ analyses. Some
circuits, “Remmer circuits,” have attributed the Remmer Court’s language to
create and apply a burden-shifting framework to questions of jury taint.107
These courts view Remmer to have clearly entitled a defendant to an
evidentiary hearing and to a presumption of prejudice.108 In contrast, other
circuits, “Phillips circuits,” reason that the plain language of Phillips
eliminated any prior entitlement to a presumption.109 The remaining circuits,
“Olano circuits,” have construed the line of cases to narrow the
presumption’s applicability to a few types of cases.110 While circuits agree
that a prima facie showing entitles a defendant to a hearing, they disagree
over whether it further creates a presumption of prejudice.111
This part analyzes how circuits have crafted their procedures to balance
considerations imposed by unclear precedent, constitutional rights, and
evolving technologies. Part II.A examines Remmer circuits, and Part II.B
analyzes the Phillips and Olano circuits. Part II.C explores how the
procedural posture of habeas corpus proceedings informs a defendant’s rights
and to what degree such posture limits a federal court’s review of state court
findings.
A. Remmer Circuits
Remmer circuits reiterate the defendant’s right to a presumption of
prejudice under the foundational case—Remmer. Yet, even where these
circuits coalesce to defend an entitlement to the presumption, they disagree
as to what kind of outside exposure triggers it and as to the degree of force
106. Compare United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 641 (4th Cir. 2012) (finding that
Remmer entitles the defendant to a presumption), with United States v. Davis, 407 F. App’x
32, 36 (6th Cir. 2011) (confining Remmer’s entitlement to only a hearing).
107. See infra Part II.A (discussing the Remmer circuits within the circuit split).
108. See, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 242 (4th Cir. 2014).
109. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing Phillips circuits).
110. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing Olano circuits).
111. See infra Parts II.A–C (contrasting cases).
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such presumption carries at a hearing. For instance, should a presumption
immediately attach whenever a defendant makes out a prima facie showing?
If so, does that presumption also automatically shift the burden?
The following sections discuss how the Second, Third, Fourth, Seventh,
Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have implemented the rights and
procedures they interpret to flow from Remmer. It explores where each of
these circuits has diverged in construing a defendant’s entitlement.
1. Hypothetical Average Juror: The Second and Third Circuits
The Second112 and Third Circuits113 use a “hypothetical juror” method to
assess the potential effects of outside influence. Pursuant to Remmer, the
Second Circuit holds that a jury’s exposure to extrinsic information
necessitates an evidentiary hearing, at which the government may rebut the
presumption of prejudice by showing harmlessness.114 Extrarecord
information triggers the presumption, and the government may only defeat it
by demonstrating that outside influence would not have affected a
hypothetical average juror.115
The Second Circuit analyzes both the nature of the outside influence and
its probable effect on an average juror to ensure the analysis remains
objective.116 In United States v. Morrison,117 an unnamed third party
attempted to bribe the jury foreman to induce a verdict favorable to the
defendant.118 The jury foreman did not report this encounter during trial, and
he only disclosed the incident once the jury had delivered its conviction and
the trial had concluded.119 Upon learning of the attempted bribery, the
district court convened a Remmer hearing.120

112. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 580 F. App’x 20, 21–22 (2d Cir. 2014); United
States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 167 (2d Cir. 2002). The court made an “independent
determination” as to whether the extrinsic evidence would have influenced “a hypothetical,
average juror” and rejected the defendant’s claim, finding it would not have. Id. at 166–67,
174.
113. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 304 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v.
Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir.
1991).
114. United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2002); Greer, 285 F.3d at 167;
United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 783 (2d Cir. 1985); Eva Kerr, Note, Prejudice,
Procedure, and a Proper Presumption: Restoring the Remmer Presumption of Prejudice in
Order to Protect Criminal Defendants’ Sixth Amendment Rights, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1451, 1470
(2008).
115. Greer, 285 F.3d at 173; United States v. Ianniello, 866 F.2d 540, 544 (2d Cir. 1989);
United States v. Hillard, 701 F.2d 1052, 1064 (2d Cir. 1983).
116. See United States v. Farhane, 634 F.3d 127, 168–70 (2d Cir. 2011); Greer, 285 F.3d
at 173.
117. 580 F. App’x 20 (2d Cir. 2014).
118. Id. at 21.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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As a court in a Remmer circuit, the district court presumed the contact to
have prejudiced the verdict and asked the government to show otherwise.121
The government argued that the length of jury deliberations and the
conviction itself evidenced harmlessness.122 Nevertheless, the court
reasoned that attempted bribery would have surely troubled a hypothetical
average juror under the same circumstances.123 The government had
therefore failed to carry its burden, and the court presumed the contact to
have compromised the jury foreman’s ability to remain impartial.124
Accordingly, the district court granted a new trial.125
While the Third Circuit also reads Remmer to presume prejudice, it does
not find the presumption particularly useful.126 Third Circuit courts rely on
Remmer’s language that “the presumption is not conclusive”127 to reduce the
presumption’s weight within a hearing.128 Upon learning that extraneous
information or contact has reached the jury, a Third Circuit district court
conducts voir dire of its jurors and asks whether the jurors can remain
impartial.129 The district court examines the jurors’ answers in conjunction
with the case’s facts to determine the possibility of prejudice.130 Thus, while
recognizing a presumption in name, Third Circuit courts neither assign a
burden to the government nor ask the government to rebut.131 Rather, juror
responses during voir dire fulfill this role, and the judge determines whether
the answers affirm or deny the possibility of prejudice.132
On appeal, the Third Circuit asks whether the extraneous influence or
contact would have impacted a hypothetical average juror’s impartiality and
subjects the defendant to “substantial prejudice.”133 Without finding
substantial prejudice to the defendant, the Third Circuit concludes that voir
dire has redressed the alleged taint.134 In one case, two jurors allegedly
violated the district court’s instructions not to seek outside information.135
Juror One posted updates about trial proceedings and jury deliberations to

121. See id. (discussing how the presumption applies when a juror is exposed to
extrajudicial influence).
122. Id. at 22.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See United States v. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x 177, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2009); United
States v. Vega, 285 F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2002); cf. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629,
643 (4th Cir. 2012) (considering the Third Circuit to not be among the Remmer circuits and
categorizing it as only applying a presumption under serious circumstances).
127. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229 (1954).
128. See Vega, 285 F.3d at 266.
129. Id. at 266; United States v. Gilsenan, 949 F.2d 90, 96 (3d Cir. 1991).
130. Vega, 285 F.3d at 266.
131. See, e.g., United States v. Fumo, 655 F.3d 288, 307 (3d Cir. 2011) (reasoning that the
court need not determine which party bears the burden of showing prejudice).
132. See Vega, 285 F.3d at 256; Gilsenan, 949 F.2d at 90.
133. United States v. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x 177, 183–84 (3d Cir. 2009); United States
v. Kemp, 500 F.3d 257, 301 (3d Cir. 2007).
134. Zgrzepski, 323 F. App’x at 183–84.
135. Fumo, 655 F.3d at 304–06.
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social media.136 Shortly after, news outlets discovered Juror One’s posts and
began featuring them on the evening news.137 Juror One watched the evening
news, where newscasters then discussed the posts and trial at length.138
Additionally, Juror Two learned from her coworkers of the defendant’s prior
convictions—evidence the judge had specifically excluded.139 Despite the
defendant’s arguments that both jurors’ outside contacts had influenced the
ultimate verdict, the Third Circuit found the alleged conduct to fall short of
producing substantial prejudice.140 By intervening only in cases of
substantial prejudice, the Third Circuit affords district courts broad latitude
to determine the merits of alleged taint through voir dire.
2. More than Innocuous: The Fourth and Seventh Circuits
Separately, the Fourth141 and Seventh142 Circuits apply Remmer’s
presumption to minimal showings of extraneous contact. For instance, the
Fourth Circuit applies the presumption to extrajudicial conduct that rises
above “innocuous” contact.143
Under this standard, the Fourth Circuit vacated a defendant’s conviction
for facilitating animal fighting when one juror used Wikipedia to search the
term “sponsor”—an element of the offense at issue.144 Because the word this
juror sought to define was integral to understanding the offense, the Fourth
Circuit found that a confirmation of this search met the prima facie burden,
and it automatically applied Remmer’s presumption.145 The government was
then unable to carry its burden to show that the juror’s internet search did not
affect the verdict, and the Fourth Circuit vacated the defendant’s
conviction.146 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit not only applies Remmer’s
presumption and the accompanying automatic burden-shifting framework,
but it comparatively places a greater burden on the government’s rebuttal
than on the defendant’s initial showing.

136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 306.
140. Id. at 306–07.
141. For examples of cases citing minimal or innocuous contact, see United States v.
Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 639–42 (4th Cir. 2012); United States v. Cheek, 94 F.3d 136, 141 (4th
Cir. 1996).
142. Seventh Circuit courts do not apply a presumption when allegations are ambiguous or
innocuous. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 692 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2012); United States
v. Delatorre, 572 F. Supp. 2d 967, 993–94 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
143. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 954 F.3d 174, 180 (4th Cir. 2020) (discussing the
standard and identifying behavior that is not innocuous and merits an evidentiary hearing).
For an example of contact that is innocuous, and therefore does not make out a prima facie
showing, see United States v. Small, 944 F.3d 490, 504–05 (4th Cir. 2019).
144. Lawson, 677 F.3d at 634, 651 (holding that juror misconduct interfered with the
defendant’s right to a fair trial).
145. Id. at 645.
146. Id. at 646–51.
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Like the Fourth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit requires a minimal prima facie
showing.147 In one case, a juror informed the court nine days after the close
of evidence that someone had written “GUILTY” in a notebook she had used
for trial.148 She reported the notation as threatening, which the Seventh
Circuit ultimately found sufficient to merit a hearing on appeal.149 The
circuit court presumed that the incident prejudiced the defendant’s trial and
required the government to rebut.150 Yet, the trial court’s record was
incomplete, leaving the government without the ability to carry its burden.151
In the absence of evidence, the Seventh Circuit found that only a mistrial
could cure a possible impairment of the defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right.152
Ultimately, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits implement lower prima facie
thresholds, which more readily permit defendants to allege jury taint in
different contexts. As both circuits also shift the burden to the government,
their flexible interpretations of a prima facie showing produce more
protective views of the Sixth Amendment than those of their sister circuits.
3. Overlooking Misconduct: The Tenth Circuit
In contrast, the Tenth Circuit limits Remmer’s presumption to cases of
third-party contact with the jury about the matter pending before it.153 As
such, the Tenth Circuit’s view has excluded various instances of juror
misconduct from review.154 For instance, the Tenth Circuit expressly
declined to apply Remmer when a potential juror shared outside information
about the impending trial with other potential jurors during voir dire.155 The
court reasoned that Remmer pertains only to communications regarding the
trial between jurors and third parties.156 Consequently, a juror’s own actions
do not enter into Remmer terrain, and only third-party influences invoke its
application.
Given the contrast between the Tenth Circuit’s view and the Fourth
Circuit’s above, these two circuits would draw different conclusions
regarding the juror who used Wikipedia to define an element of the alleged

147. See supra note 142 (providing examples of cases using a minimal threshold).
148. United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 502 F.3d 700, 702 (7th Cir. 2007).
149. Id. at 702, 705.
150. Id. at 705.
151. The district court had elected not to question other jurors about the notation, which
left the record devoid of evidence that may have rebutted the presumption. Id.
152. Id. at 707–08.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Robertson, 473 F.3d 1289, 1294–95 (10th Cir. 2007)
(explaining the goal of precluding incidental contact between jurors and nonjurors from
coming before the court); United States v. Brooks, 161 F.3d 1240, 1246–47 (10th Cir. 1998)
(qualifying what contact pertains to the matter before the court).
154. See United States v. Henderson, 564 F. App’x 352, 367–68 (10th Cir. 2014); Stouffer
v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 (10th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases).
155. United States v. Hawley, 660 F. App’x 702, 709 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016).
156. See id.
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offense.157 The very juror behavior that ultimately led the Fourth Circuit to
vacate a defendant’s conviction would not have been contemplated as
Remmer-worthy in the Tenth Circuit.
4. Sometimes Automatic: The Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit is best categorized as a “semi-Remmer circuit”
because it epitomizes the indecision and disagreement among its sister
circuits. In 2006, the Eleventh Circuit held that a prima facie showing of
extrinsic evidence presumes prejudice.158 It even formulated factors to
determine what showing satisfies the rebuttal burden borne by the
government.159 However, in the same case, the court noted its previous
departure from Remmer in two cases decided sixteen years prior.160
More recently, in a 2017 case, the Eleventh Circuit presumed that
interactions between the defendant’s friends and jurors had prejudiced that
trial.161 Although seemingly reiterating its adherence to Remmer, the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court’s holding that the government
had carried its burden where the jurors at issue had proclaimed their ability
to remain impartial throughout trial.162 In that sense, the word of a
potentially partial jury was sufficient to confirm its own impartiality. Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a relaxed stance on procedural burdens and
presumptions in the face of jury taint allegations.163
5. Discretionary Use: The Eighth Circuit
Last, while the Eighth Circuit claims to abide by Remmer, it narrowly and
selectively applies the presumption.164 The Eighth Circuit has previously
declared that a defendant is not entitled to a Remmer hearing or presumption

157. See supra notes 144–46 (discussing United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir.
2012)).
158. United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006) (encompassing both
outside influence and juror misconduct).
159. Id. at 1299–300. The following factors identify when the government has successfully
rebutted the presumption: “(1) the nature of the extrinsic evidence; (2) the manner in which
the information reached the jury; (3) the factual findings in the district court and the manner
of the court’s inquiry into the juror issues; and (4) the strength of the government’s case.” Id.
at 1300.
160. Id. at 1299 n.36 (first citing United States v. Rowe, 906 F.2d 654, 656–57 (11th Cir.
1990); and then citing United States v. De La Vega, 913 F.2d 861, 870 (11th Cir. 1990)). In
the same footnote, the Eleventh Circuit recognized and recited “the apparent conflict between
the standard pronounced in Rowe and the unambiguous mandate of Remmer,” which it then
refused to resolve. Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez, 14 F.3d 543, 550 n.3 (11th Cir.
1994)).
161. United States v. Schlecht, 679 F. App’x 817, 818 (11th Cir. 2017).
162. Id.
163. See also Kerr, supra note 114, at 1463 (characterizing the Eleventh Circuit as having
no articulated standard).
164. But see United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 643 (4th Cir. 2012) (including the
Eighth Circuit among those circuits that do not follow Remmer).
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for points of law165 or factual evidence developed at trial.166 In fact, the
Eighth Circuit has restricted Remmer to cases “with facts like Remmer[],”
which it categorizes purely as instances of outside communication or
tampering.167 Moreover, where a defendant alleges taint or outside influence
within the Eighth Circuit’s designated Remmer territory, the court calls on
Remmer to supplement, not govern, the analysis.168
Should district courts in the Eighth Circuit deem a Remmer hearing
appropriate, they then retain discretion to assign the burden to either party
after having reviewed the case’s facts.169 For instance, in United States v.
Harris-Thompson,170 the district court investigated potential contact between
members of the defendant’s family and the jurors.171 The court questioned
the potentially compromised jurors, weighed the gravity of the allegations
against the likelihood that they occurred, and determined the concerns would
not have prejudiced the verdict.172 This result departs from the classic
Remmer recipe, neither presuming prejudice nor asking the government to
rebut.173 Instead, the district court used Remmer as guidance to investigate,
leaving the execution of that inquiry subject to the court’s discretion.174
While cloaked as a Remmer circuit, the Eighth Circuit resembles Olano
circuits, asking what effect, if any, an intrusion had on the jury’s deliberation
and verdict.175 The following section explores the Phillips and Olano
circuits’ departures from Remmer and the procedures they formulated to
replace it.
B. The Phillips and Olano Circuits
Other circuits have sharply deviated from Remmer’s presumption.
Specifically, the First, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and D.C. Circuits have instead
adopted the standards articulated in Phillips or Olano. This section explores
the Phillips circuits and Olano circuits in turn.

165. United States v. Blumeyer, 62 F.3d 1013, 1016 (8th Cir. 1995) (reasoning that, even
when substantive, issues of law are beyond the jury’s consideration and therefore cannot
prejudice the defendant under Remmer).
166. United States v. Honken, 541 F.3d 1146, 1167 (8th Cir. 2008).
167. Id.
168. See generally United States v. Harris-Thompson, 751 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2014); United
States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016 (8th Cir. 1998).
169. Tucker, 137 F.3d at 1030 (discussing how the court could not ascertain from the case’s
facts whether to apply the presumption and shift the burden); see also Harris-Thompson, 751
F.3d at 597 (“[T]he court understood the inquiry that Remmer and other cases required and
attempted to fashion a procedure . . . .”).
170. 751 F.3d 590 (8th Cir. 2014).
171. Id. at 598.
172. Id.
173. See generally id.
174. See id. at 596–97.
175. United States v. Hall, 877 F.3d 800, 806 (8th Cir. 2017); United States v. Honken, 541
F.3d 1146, 1167 (8th Cir. 2008); United States v. Tucker, 137 F.3d 1016, 1030 (8th Cir. 1998).
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1. Phillips Circuits
In contrast to the Remmer circuits, Phillips circuits interpret the majority
opinion in Phillips to have restricted the entitlements allotted to defendants
under Remmer.176 Where Remmer previously awarded defendants the right
to a hearing and a presumption of prejudice at that hearing, Phillips now
limits Remmer’s rule to a hearing alone.177 Under this view, a prima facie
showing of jury taint is no longer presumed to have prejudiced a defendant’s
right to a fair trial. Eliminating the presumption converts the hearing into an
opportunity for the defendant to persuade the court of prejudice, rather than
an opportunity for the government to show juror impartiality. Thus, Phillips
circuits repackage the government’s burden as the defendant’s at a
hearing.178
Specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits make up the Phillips
circuits. The Sixth Circuit outwardly rejects the presumption of prejudice.179
The Fifth and D.C. Circuits acknowledge the presumption’s theoretical
existence, but they place it just out of a defendant’s reach. Instead, a
defendant in the Fifth or D.C. Circuit must additionally establish a likelihood
of prejudice on top of the initial prima facie showing.180 These sections first
explore the Sixth Circuit and then explore the Fifth and D.C. Circuits.
a. Goodbye Remmer: The Sixth Circuit
The Sixth Circuit abandoned the Remmer presumption after the Supreme
Court decided Phillips.181 It finds Phillips to have reinterpreted Remmer,
shifting the burden of proof onto the defendant to demonstrate that alleged
outside contact with jurors resulted in actual juror partiality.182 As such, a
defendant in the Sixth Circuit retains the burden in a Remmer hearing, and
“[p]rejudice is not to be presumed.”183
176. See, e.g., United States v. Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998); United States
v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496–97 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d
521, 532 (6th Cir. 1984).
177. See supra note 176.
178. See supra note 176.
179. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 407 F. App’x 32, 36 (6th Cir. 2011); United States
v. Gillespie, 61 F.3d 457, 460 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 95 (6th
Cir. 1988).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that,
in light of Phillips and Olano, the government should only be required to rebut after a court
determines a likelihood of prejudice); United States v. Edelin, 283 F. Supp. 2d 8, 15 (D.D.C.
2003) (discussing how this court first has discretion to convene a hearing and, that when it
does, it only applies the presumption to a sufficient likelihood of prejudice).
181. Pennell, 737 F.2d at 532. In the Sixth Circuit, Remmer no longer governs the question
of burden; it only “controls the question of how the district court should proceed where such
allegations are made, i.e., a hearing must be held during which the defendant is entitled to be
heard.” Id.
182. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 95 (“This Court has consistently held that Smith v. Phillips
reinterpreted Remmer to shift the burden of showing bias to the defendant rather than placing
a heavy burden on the government.”); see also Davis, 407 F. App’x at 36–37.
183. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 95 (quoting Pennell, 737 F.2d at 532).
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In a recent case, the defendant reported having received a LinkedIn
notification from a member of the community where he stood trial and had
been convicted.184 After some additional research, the defendant learned that
this person was the live-in girlfriend of one of the jurors.185 The defendant
presented the court with evidence that the juror had disclosed details of the
ongoing trial to his girlfriend, after which she had searched Google for
additional details.186 The first page of search results included information
that the court had specifically precluded the government from presenting at
trial.187 Thus, not only had the juror violated his oath by discussing details
of the trial, but he also may have learned information that threatened to
prejudice the proceedings.188
The Sixth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to conduct a
Remmer hearing, explaining that the defendant would be entitled to a new
trial on all counts if the district court found prejudice.189 If the district court
did not, the Sixth Circuit continued, the defendant’s convictions would
stand.190 The district court convened a Remmer hearing, at which the
defendant was not entitled to a presumption and was expected to prove actual
prejudice.191 His inability to do so resulted in the reinstatement of all
convictions.192
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit’s retreat from Remmer’s presumption places
greater onus on the defendant to show juror partiality. For defendants
alleging a tainted jury, the path to a new trial is far more arduous in the Sixth
Circuit than in others.193
b. A Sufficient Likelihood: The Fifth and D.C. Circuits
Moreover, the Fifth194 and D.C.195 Circuits grant district courts discretion
to apply a presumption, but they limit its application to few circumstances.
Even when addressing jury tampering, which directly mirrors the facts of

184. United States v. Harris, 881 F.3d 945, 952 (6th Cir. 2018).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 952–53.
187. Id. at 952.
188. Id. at 953–54.
189. Id. at 954.
190. Id.; see also United States v. Lanier, 870 F.3d 546, 551 (6th Cir. 2017) (“Subject to
review by this court, if the Remmer hearing reveals that any external influence prejudicially
affected jury deliberations, defendants are entitled to a new trial, but if the Remmer hearing
reveals that no external influence prejudicially affected jury deliberations, defendants’
convictions must be reinstated.”).
191. United States v. Harris, No. 15CR335-2, 2018 WL 3869579, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Aug.
15, 2018).
192. Id.
193. Compare id. (reinstating a conviction where a defendant could not produce evidence
of actual prejudice), with United States v. Vasquez-Ruiz, 502 F.3d 700, 707–08 (7th Cir. 2007)
(reversing a conviction where the government could not rebut presumed prejudice).
194. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 354 F.3d 390, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Sylvester, 143 F.3d 923, 932–33 (5th Cir. 1998).
195. See, e.g., United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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Remmer, the Fifth Circuit has not presumed prejudice.196 In one case,
unidentified third parties phoned two jurors and asked for details about the
case, requested that another juror be lenient on the defendants, and delivered
a mysterious package to another juror’s home.197 The Fifth Circuit declined
to presume that such contact would have prejudiced the jury, stating that the
presumption “cannot survive Phillips and Olano.”198
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit must find a sufficient “likelihood of prejudice”
before it shifts the burden to the government.199 In United States v. WilliamsDavis,200 the defendants asserted numerous instances of juror misconduct,
alleging that the jurors partook in conversations with third parties, read
newspaper articles, relied on dictionaries to define legal terms, deliberated
prematurely amongst themselves, and withheld information during voir
dire.201 In reviewing each allegation, the D.C. Circuit explained that its
standard is not whether the defendant proffered evidence, but it is whether
the alleged circumstances are sufficiently likely to produce prejudice.202 It
held that these facts were insufficient and declined to apply the
presumption.203 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit views the presumption as not
“particularly forceful,” if it even applies at all.204
While the Sixth, Fifth, and D.C. Circuits agree that Remmer entitles a
defendant to a hearing, they conclude that Phillips removed the presumption
and refrain from requiring the government to show harmlessness.
Defendants standing trial in these circuits therefore retain the burden of
proving prejudice throughout each stage of the court’s inquiry.205
2. Olano Circuits
Pivoting to Olano, the First and Ninth Circuits supplant the burden-shifting
framework with a fact-intensive inquiry into whether the alleged jury taint
impacts a defendant’s substantive rights. Such determinations lean heavily
on district judges’ experience and discretion. This subsection explores the
First Circuit and Ninth Circuit in turn.
a. Merit-Based Claims: The First Circuit
The First Circuit engages in Justice O’Connor’s specific analysis to
address the merits of jury taint allegations and to determine whether
196. See Sylvester, 143 F.3d at 933–34 (finding that the defendant bears the burden even
where third parties pressured several jurors to tamper with the verdict).
197. Id. at 931–32.
198. Id. at 934; see also United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 288 (1st Cir. 2002)
(explaining that “[i]n the wake of [Phillips] and Olano,” the Fifth Circuit concluded that
“Remmer is a dead letter”).
199. See Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d at 497.
200. 90 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
201. See generally id.
202. Id. at 496–97.
203. Id. at 497.
204. Id. at 496.
205. See supra Part II.B.1.
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Remmer’s presumption should apply.206 A district judge will investigate an
allegation by “assessing the magnitude and extent of any prejudice
caused.”207 Upon finding a colorable claim, the district courts weigh the risk
of influence to a juror against the juror’s testimony that he can (or did) remain
impartial.208 Judges then reserve discretion to designate the appropriate
method of investigation.209 When a court identifies jury taint and its
likelihood of prejudicing a jury, the court may cure it in any number of ways,
including: discharging particular jurors, giving new instructions, or granting
a mistrial.210
In United States v. Zimny,211 the defendant appealed his case after learning
that former jurors had posted details about his trial to a blog forum.212 The
trial court interviewed one suspected former juror, but it did not investigate
the other.213 On appeal, the First Circuit determined that an investigation
into the unexamined juror’s contact was necessary; yet, it noted a trial court’s
broad discretion to shape that investigation’s rigor and depth.214 Thus, First
Circuit courts deviate from the categorical approaches espoused in Remmer
and Phillips. Rather, they conduct fact-intensive inquiries aimed at analyzing
the merits of each allegation before they commit to a course of action.
b. Jury Tampering Is Different: The Ninth Circuit
Like the First Circuit, the Ninth Circuit conducts a fact-intensive inquiry
to discern whether alleged jury taint may warrant a Remmer presumption. To
determine whether the misconduct or extraneous influences merit a
presumption, Ninth Circuit courts consider a variety of factors, such as the
seriousness of the allegations, the content of the allegations, and the
credibility of the information’s source.215
Specifically, this circuit distinguishes between jury tampering, on the one
hand, and other juror misconduct or improper contact, on the other.216 United

206. See United States v. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d 278, 287–92 (1st Cir. 2002); see also United
States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 50–54 (1st Cir. 2007) (discussing First Circuit jurisprudence).
207. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52.
208. Id. at 52–53 (identifying how a threatening gesture may impact the trial by evaluating
the risk of (1) a juror associating the threat with the defendant and (2) influence on the juror’s
deliberation process); see supra Part II.A.5 (likening the Eighth Circuit’s process to the Olano
circuits’ processes).
209. United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 465 (1st Cir. 2017) (“The touchstone is
reasonableness: did the trial court fashion, and then even-handedly implement, a sensible
procedure reasonably calculated to determine whether something untoward had occurred?”
(quoting United States v. Paniagua-Ramos, 251 F.3d 242, 249–50 (1st Cir. 2001))).
210. Bradshaw, 281 F.3d at 289.
211. 846 F.3d 458 (1st Cir. 2017).
212. Id. at 461–64.
213. Id. at 465, 467–68.
214. Id. at 467, 472.
215. United States v. Brande, 329 F.3d 1173, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
Saya, 247 F.3d 929, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2001).
216. Brande, 329 F.3d at 1176 (distinguishing the facts of Remmer from later cases, like
Olano, because jury tampering clearly deserves a presumption).

2020]

OPENING PANDORA’S JURY BOX

253

States v. Henley217 addressed an attempt to bribe jurors for a verdict favorable
to the defendant.218 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
had erred by not immediately presuming prejudice and assigning a burden to
Because jury tampering is “qualitatively more
the government.219
prejudicial” than other kinds of extraneous influence, the court reasoned, it
merits Remmer’s automatic presumption.220 Thus, pursuant to Olano, the
type of intrusion instructs when to presume prejudice.
As evidenced above, the circuit split is a far cry from clean cut. The
following section dives deeper to examine how posture complicates the
doctrine and compounds the existing split.
C. Habeas Corpus Overlay
Habeas corpus cases complicate the inquiries into whether to rely on
Remmer’s presumption and by what standard to review allegations of jury
taint. As background, defendants convicted in state systems may petition
federal courts for a writ of habeas corpus—a collateral attack221—by
asserting that a constitutional right has been violated.222 When reviewing a
state court’s decision, a federal court examines whether the decision (1) was
contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law
or (2) was predicated on an unreasonable determination of the facts presented
at trial.223 Thus, a federal court’s review of habeas corpus cases contrasts
with the abuse of discretion standard typical of cases on direct appeal.224
Moreover, the federal court must also determine that the state court’s error
“actually prejudiced” the defendant.225
In sum, the habeas posture changes a federal court’s calculus. It requires
a defendant to carry the burden of persuasion throughout each aspect of the
case, and it affords the state court a graciously forgiving standard of
review.226 Of the three foundational Supreme Court cases, only Phillips was
a habeas case. Accordingly, there is an implicit question of whether Phillips
is comparable to Remmer despite the difference between defendants’ rights
on appeal.

217. 238 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir. 2001).
218. See generally id.
219. Id. at 1118–19 (remanding the case for further investigation).
220. Id. at 1115 (explaining that jury tampering directly implicates a defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to a fair trial).
221. Collateral attacks afford the defendant an indirect means to be heard in federal court
after the defendant has exhausted all state remedies.
222. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
223. Id.
224. For examples of cases on direct appeal in which the abuse of discretion standard was
applied, see United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 680 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Vega,
285 F.3d 256, 265 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Greer, 285 F.3d 158, 171 (2d Cir. 2002).
225. Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 239 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting Bauberger v. Haynes,
632 F.3d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 2011)).
226. See Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 116 (2007) (explaining that the standard of review
must be lenient since collateral attacks threaten “finality, comity, and federalism”).
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Specifically, habeas petitioners who allege jury taint assert a violation of
their Sixth or Fourteenth Amendment rights.227 In Phillips, the defendant
alleged a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right, and he
argued that such injury necessitated a writ of habeas corpus.228 In response,
the Court focused its analysis on defining due process in cases of alleged
taint, and it identified the procedure that due process requires.229 Even where
outside influences tiptoe past procedural safeguards, like voir dire and trial
instructions, a breach does not per se entitle a defendant to a new trial or
vacated conviction.230 Rather, due process violations are appropriately
remedied by evidentiary hearings.231 To hold that a breach necessitates a
writ of habeas corpus, as the lower courts had in Phillips, would suggest that
due process requires more of state courts than of federal courts.232 Therefore,
where a state court convenes a hearing, the state court has complied with due
process requirements.233
A Sixth Amendment injury—not due process—entitles the defendant to a
new trial or writ of habeas corpus.234 As the moving party, the defendant
bears the burden of demonstrating an injury to his Sixth Amendment right to
an impartial jury.235 Upon making this showing, the defendant will have
adduced sufficient evidence for the reviewing court to grant a writ of habeas
corpus or mandate a new trial.236 Short of this showing, the defendant has
not alleged a Sixth Amendment injury and is therefore not entitled to a new
trial or writ.237
The unique procedural criteria inherent to habeas cases overlay the
existing circuit split with even more confusion. A circuit court’s relationship
to Remmer may turn on its understanding of Phillips. Whether it views the
habeas posture as relevant to a defendant’s entitlements on appeal instructs
whether it views Phillips as an exception to Remmer’s rule or as a limitation
on Remmer’s power. The following part addresses, in part, how posture
informs a circuit’s review.

227. See, e.g., Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 214 (1982) (Fourteenth Amendment);
Barnes, 751 F.3d at 239 (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments); Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d
1205, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (Sixth Amendment); Hall v. Zenk, 692 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir.
2012) (Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments).
228. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 214, 217.
229. Id. at 217.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 217–18; Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031–33 (6th Cir. 2019).
232. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 218 (reasoning that a Remmer hearing in federal court complies
with constitutional requirements).
233. See id. at 221 (limiting federal review in habeas cases since federal courts reviewing
federal habeas actions “hold no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may
intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension”).
234. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033.
235. Id.; see supra Part I.C (discussing burden-shifting).
236. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033; see also Lang v. Bobby, 889 F.3d 803, 812 (6th Cir. 2018)
(distinguishing a habeas petitioner’s case from the direct appeal precedent on which he relied).
237. Ewing, 914 F.3d at 1033 (“Until [the defendant] shows actual prejudice, he has shown
only a due process violation—for denial of an opportunity to prove prejudice—and not yet a
violation of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.”).
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III. ADJUSTING THE LEGAL SANDBOX
This part argues that courts can harmonize the three Supreme Court cases
that sparked the circuit split. Despite a deepening split, circuits begin their
analyses in the same manner. First, each defendant must make out a
colorable claim of jury taint.238 This showing permits the court to address
the basic dimensions of an intrusion, asking what happened and what impact
it had on the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Courts further agree that a
sufficient showing entitles a defendant to an evidentiary hearing.239 They
diverge, however, in how they perceive the presumption and allocate its
burdens.
This part argues that the inquiry into whether to apply or reject Remmer’s
presumption is too narrow, rendering subsequent procedure too rigid. This
Note makes three observations to reconcile the Court’s seemingly disparate
holdings and to recommend a unified analysis moving forward. First, this
part distinguishes between prehearing and posthearing remedies,240 and it
then argues that timing instructs different burdens within the same legal
framework. Second, this part argues that Olano extends, rather than limits,
Remmer’s presumption. Third, this part analyzes where procedural posture
confuses circuit analysis, and it seeks to disentangle the different standards.
These three considerations, taken together, bridge the gaps in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Last, this part proposes a path forward for circuits to redress
jury taint in the digital era.
A. Prehearing Versus Posthearing Remedies
This section argues that Remmer and Phillips should be understood as
individual developments in the legal framework, not as conflicting
propositions about presumptions. Their relationship turns largely on whether
a claim of jury taint is prehearing or posthearing. Where the trial court
previously refused to convene a hearing, Remmer governs. Where the trial
court granted a hearing, Phillips explains that the defendant bears the burden
of persuasion.
Some circuits have grounded their rejection of Remmer in the Phillips
Court’s highly debated and sometimes acclaimed line: “This Court has long
held that the remedy for allegations of juror partiality is a hearing in which
the defendant has the opportunity to prove actual bias.”241 Circuits have
inevitably latched onto the Court’s use of “the defendant,” reading Phillips
to shift the burden from the government to the defendant.242 Yet the
238. See supra Parts I.C.1–2.
239. See supra Parts II.A–B. Although, they disagree as to what evidence satisfies that
threshold.
240. These labels refer respectively to when a court has yet to grant a hearing and has
already agreed to convene one.
241. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215 (1982); accord United States v. Sylvester, 143
F.3d 923, 934 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Williams-Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 496 (D.C. Cir.
1996); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521, 532–33 (6th Cir. 1984).
242. See supra Part II.B (observing that some circuits view Phillips as having overruled
Remmer).
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surrounding phrases, “a hearing in which” and “to prove actual bias,” are
more instructive.243
The Remmer Court established the remedy for prehearing allegations.244
As a matter of due process, the defendant is entitled to a hearing at which all
parties examine the effect of outside influence on the jury.245 Since the lower
courts in Remmer had denied the defendant an evidentiary hearing, they had
denied him due process of the law.246 Without a further inquiry, the Supreme
Court could at most presume that such contact with the jury prejudiced the
defendant’s trial.247 By remanding the case for a hearing, the Supreme Court
instructed future courts to gather all parties to the litigation before
investigating extraneous influence.248 Either judicial inaction or ex parte
responses to credible allegations of jury taint deprive the defendant of due
process of the law. Thus, Remmer prescribes a prehearing remedy to alleged
jury taint as a measure of ensuring due process.
In contrast, Phillips instructs the proper procedure posthearing. In
Phillips, the trial court had already convened an evidentiary hearing, only
after which it concluded that such evidence had not prejudiced the
defendant.249 In essence, the trial court in Phillips accorded the precise
remedy called for by the Remmer Court. The Supreme Court then ventured
a step beyond the Remmer Court’s initial holding, endeavoring to establish
what must happen during a hearing for the presiding court to vacate a
conviction.250 By distinguishing between injuries to procedural rights and
injuries to substantive rights, the Court quelled ambiguity about which
remedy redresses which injury.251 The relief a defendant seeks must match
the constitutional violation alleged.252
Phillips explained that the defendant bears the ultimate burden of
persuading a court to grant a mistrial or vacate a conviction. 253 Regardless
of whether a court initially applies a presumption, the defendant bears this
burden. And even where a court initially presumes prejudice, thereby
assigning a burden to the government, the defendant may carry this ultimate
burden in one of two ways. If the government cannot rebut, the defendant
has carried his burden to persuade the court to grant a mistrial or vacate the
conviction. Alternatively, if the government does rebut the presumed
243. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215.
244. See generally Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
245. See, e.g., Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031 (6th Cir. 2019) (citing Remmer to
demonstrate that “due process requires the opportunity to show” that the extraneous
information tainted the jury).
246. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
247. See infra Part III.B (discussing how the degree of intrusion merited a presumption).
248. See Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229–30.
249. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 216–18 (1982) (explaining that the trial judge found
no evidence to suggest prejudice).
250. See id. at 215; see supra Part II.C (discussing the difference between constitutional
rights).
251. See generally Phillips, 455 U.S. 209.
252. See Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027, 1031–33 (6th Cir. 2019).
253. See Phillips, 455 U.S. at 215 (citing prior Supreme Court cases that required actual
bias).
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prejudice, the defendant may carry his burden by demonstrating actual
prejudice. Irrespective of the presumption’s application or force, a defendant
must carry this ultimate burden to persuade the presiding court to grant a
mistrial or vacate a conviction.
Thus, Phillips addressed a discrete issue than Remmer had contemplated.
In fact, Phillips overlooked a presumption and instead addressed broader
procedure. Because the cases address distinct stages of the court’s inquiry,
the appropriate lens for understanding their relationship first turns on whether
a case is prehearing or posthearing. Remmer protects the defendant’s right
to an evidentiary hearing once he has made the requisite showing of jury
taint. Twenty-eight years later, Phillips reiterated Remmer’s holding by
examining whether the trial court had afforded the defendant the very remedy
Remmer had prescribed. Upon finding it had, the Phillips Court deemed
Remmer satisfied, and it moved forward to explain the defendant’s burden
once at a hearing. Therefore, Phillips does not reduce Remmer. It lives
alongside Remmer as a companion, establishing the defendant’s burden
regardless of whether the evidence initially presumed prejudice.
B. Jury What?: Expanding the Jury Taint Category
While Phillips did not address the presumption’s applicability, Olano
did.254 The Olano Court explained that the type of taint informs whether to
presume prejudice.255 This section argues that Olano did not restrict
Remmer, but it in fact expanded its holding by extending Remmer’s rule to
other forms of taint.
First, the Olano Court established that not all intrusions presume prejudice
to the defendant.256 In that case, specifically, the Court focused on the kind
of contact that should warrant a presumption.257 Instead of restricting
Remmer to cases that share similar facts, as some Remmer circuits do,258 the
Olano Court suggested that jury taint is amorphous. In response, the proper
lens for examining allegations must be equally flexible. This analysis opened
the door to other types of taint that would not have previously implicated
Remmer.
In doing so, Olano further reflects the importance of evaluating what types
of intrusion may presume prejudice.259 The Olano Court cites Remmer as “a
prime example,” recounting third-party contact with a juror, the appearance

254. See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
255. See id. at 739.
256. Id. at 738–39 (assessing the impact on the verdict to discern which intrusions should
presume prejudice).
257. Id. at 737. The Court discusses Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b), which is a
procedural dimension outside the scope of this Note. See generally id.
258. For examples of circuits that restrict Remmer’s doctrine to cases like Remmer, such as
the Tenth and Eighth Circuits, see supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
259. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 737–38 (rejecting the facts in the case as insufficient).
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of a bribe, and an FBI investigation.260 The Court found facts like Remmer’s
to presume prejudice because their egregious nature threatens the integrity of
a jury’s verdict to a greater extent than other intrusions may.261 Indeed, the
circumstances in Remmer were sufficient to presume prejudice but not
necessary. Olano explains that lesser intrusions may equally merit a court’s
attention.262 As such, Olano supplements Remmer by allowing courts to
conduct “specific analys[es]” into circumstances that may not trigger the
rebuttable presumption.263
Remmer circuits have suggested that Olano undermines Remmer’s rule by
permitting courts to decide between a presumption and a specific analysis.264
However, this argument misunderstands that not all instances of jury taint
result from third-party attempts to induce a verdict, nor should all presume
prejudice. To assume that any allegation, however small, merits a
presumption would equip every defendant with sweepstake incentive to
allege jury taint, and it would render few trials permissible.265 On the other
hand, restricting the presumption to apply only to third-party intrusions
discounts cases, like Olano, that do not involve outside influence.266 It would
ignore juror misconduct completely, which would fissure Remmer’s
entitlement and withhold remedial measures from defendants whose trials
were made partial through misconduct.
Accordingly, Olano did not constrain or weaken Remmer. It left intact a
court’s ability to presume prejudice when warranted, and it supplemented the
types of activity that may prejudice a verdict. Whether the intrusion entitles
a defendant to a presumption at the hearing should not inform a court’s
decision to convene one at all. Instead, Olano recognizes that jury taint
comes in many forms, not all of which will resemble facts so shocking as to
presume prejudice on their face. By distinguishing between the types of
intrusions, courts are more apt to determine the effects on jury deliberations,
the verdict, and defendants’ rights.
Ultimately, special attention to how these three cases interact illustrates
the underlying harmony among them. Remmer examines a prehearing injury
and redresses it by granting the defendant an entitlement to a hearing. The
facts of Remmer were sufficiently extreme to presume prejudice, but the
260. Id. at 738. The Court further referenced the per se rules it established in Turner and
Parker as replete with facts that confirmed prejudice to the defendant. See Parker v. Gladden,
385 U.S. 363, 363 (1966); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 467–68 (1965).
261. Olano, 507 U.S. at 738 (collecting cases).
262. Compare Turner, 379 U.S. at 467–68 (per se prejudicial), and Remmer v. United
States, 347 U.S. 227, 229–30 (1954) (presumed prejudicial), with Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S.
560, 571–72 (1986) (not prejudicial), and Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1033 (1984) (not
prejudicial).
263. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 739.
264. See Hall v. Zenk, 692 F.3d 793, 800–02 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Lawson, 677
F.3d 629, 641–43 (4th Cir. 2012).
265. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982) (discussing policy concerns about
permitting per se invalidation of trial proceedings).
266. Olano, 507 U.S. at 739; see also United States v. Zimny, 846 F.3d 458, 462–66 (1st
Cir. 2017).

2020]

OPENING PANDORA’S JURY BOX

259

Court neither endorsed nor foreclosed the use of a presumption in other
situations. Olano then explained how to presume prejudice, encouraging
courts to conduct a specific analysis when presuming prejudice would not be
appropriate. Once at a hearing, Phillips governs what burden the defendant
must bear before a reviewing court will vacate the conviction.
C. Collateral Attack Versus Direct Appeal
Last, this section argues that a case’s posture influences how circuits have
inconsistently applied the presumption, unnecessarily muddying the
doctrine. Remmer, a case on direct appeal, asked the Court to review for an
abuse of discretion.267 Comparatively, this standard benefits the defendant
because it gives a reviewing court full visibility into the evidence, logic, and
discretion of the lower court.268 Because Phillips rose through the federal
courts on a habeas action,269 the Court could not disturb anything short of a
constitutional violation producing substantial and injurious effect on the
verdict.270
Some Remmer circuits point to the intentionally restrictive habeas
procedure to suggest that Phillips may be altogether inconsistent with
Remmer.271 These circuits either selectively apply the presumption to habeas
cases, or they withhold it from habeas cases altogether.272 Specifically,
Remmer circuits extend the presumption to cases on direct appeal, and they
engage in a case-specific analysis to discern whether presumptions may ever
apply in habeas cases.273
The habeas petitioner must demonstrate in part that a state court’s decision
contradicted or unreasonably applied existing Supreme Court precedent.274
Therefore, to obtain relief in a Remmer circuit, a defendant may spotlight a
state court’s refusal or failure to apply the presumption as evidence of that
state court having violated clearly established federal law.275 A defendant
may be successful in obtaining a writ where he can demonstrate that a state
court’s failure to apply the presumption resulted in actual prejudice.276
267. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229.
268. For examples of cases in which the abuse of discretion standard was used, see supra
note 224. For examples of cases with habeas posture, see Ewing v. Horton, 914 F.3d 1027,
1030 (6th Cir. 2019); Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 246–49 (4th Cir. 2014); Hall v. Zenk,
692 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2012).
269. Phillips, 455 U.S. at 218.
270. Id. at 218, 221. While this is the majority’s position, the dissent argues that the habeas
posture “poses no obstacle to this conclusion” since the Court could deem the state court’s
findings unreliable and conduct its own inquiry. Id. at 243 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
271. See infra notes 273–83 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 273–83 and accompanying text.
273. See, e.g., Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 n.5 (10th Cir. 2013); Hall, 692
F.3d at 805.
274. See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text.
275. See, e.g., Barnes v. Joyner, 751 F.3d 229, 237–49 (4th Cir. 2014); Hall, 692 F.3d at
804–06; Wisehart v. Davis, 408 F.3d 321, 326–28 (7th Cir. 2005). But cf. Crease v. McKune,
189 F.3d 1188, 1193 (10th Cir. 1999) (arguing that the presumption is a rule of criminal
procedure, not constitutional law, and therefore cannot apply in habeas cases).
276. See Hall, 692 F.3d at 805; Bibbins v. Dalsheim, 21 F.3d 13, 16 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Especially in a circuit that strongly enforces the presumption, a defendant
more easily satisfies the habeas burden.
Alternatively, other Remmer circuits assert that habeas petitioners
relinquish the right to a presumption altogether.277 Under this view, any
defendant in either the state or federal system retains his right to a
presumption so long as he appeals within the same system.278 When stepping
outside of one system, however, the defendant forfeits that right.279 The
Fourth Circuit previously explained this distinction when it noted how
appellate state courts should have afforded one defendant a presumption.280
Yet, since the state courts had not done so and the case had arrived at the
Fourth Circuit through collateral attack, the circuit court could not restore
that same right to the defendant.281 Thus, the potential success of a
defendant’s claim hinges on how the reviewing circuit understands Remmer
and its progeny.282
These approaches unnecessarily restrict when, to whom, and to which case
a rebuttable presumption may apply. They complicate the doctrine and how
circuits successively adopt it. These approaches further insinuate that
Phillips, for its habeas posture, is maximally an exception to the Remmer
presumption instead of a companion case seeking to clarify federal law.283
As discussed in Part III.A, however, courts can mend the brewing split by
reconceptualizing the relationship between Remmer and Phillips.
D. Redressing Threats in a Digital Age
This section suggests that contemplating the three categories offered above
reconciles the case law and forges a path to redress jury taint in the face of
advancing technologies. It further urges that increased exposure to
information expedites the need for reform.
The rise of the digital age presents increased opportunities for juries to
misbehave or to become the targets of outside influence. Roughly ten years
ago, federal courts and a handful of state courts rewrote their jury instructions
to include bans on “tweeting, texting, blogging, emailing, or researching
proceedings online.”284 Yet, despite efforts to adapt, courts still saw a rise in
motions for mistrial due to internet-related misconduct.285 Thus, the added
procedural mitigant did little to quash the ultimate effect on defendants’
277. See, e.g., Barnes, 751 F.3d at 246–49; Hall, 692 F.3d at 804–06.
278. See supra note 277.
279. See Stouffer v. Trammell, 738 F.3d 1205, 1214 n.5 (10th Cir. 2013) (noting that the
Remmer presumption of prejudice does not apply in a collateral review).
280. Barnes, 751 F.3d at 252.
281. Id.
282. See supra Part II.C.
283. Cf. United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629, 642 (4th Cir. 2012) (referring to Remmer
and Olano for their postures, rather than Phillips, where the court was analyzing a case on
direct appeal).
284. Brian Grow, Juror Could Face Charges for Online Research, REUTERS (Jan. 19,
2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-internet-juror/juror-could-face-charges-for-onlineresearch-idUSTRE70I5KI20110119 [https://perma.cc/G2KC-HM4X].
285. See id.
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rights. Provided that technology has since advanced to grant users greater,
quicker access to information, jury taint is increasingly more likely.
Not only does technology erode traditional access barriers, but the societal
moment may eventually call for a strictly technology-based approach to jury
trials. As the country navigates the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, courts are
considering whether virtual trials are feasible.286 They are primarily
contemplating the impact of separating the judge from the jury, how the jury
may deliberate, and how to prevent jurors from conducting independent
research.287
This moment exposes how current procedural tools for preserving
impartiality rely on the ability to sequester jurors or temporarily confine their
access to phones or computers.288 In a virtual trial, what mechanisms ensure
that jurors are not continuously texting each other? How would a court
prevent jurors from simultaneously researching whom they see or what they
hear during the course of each party’s argument? Without a court’s ability
to monitor jurors at a physical trial, jurors are especially vulnerable to outside
influence.
Now consider not only the added structural obstacle that virtual trials
present to detecting taint, but also consider the disagreement among courts
as to what qualifies as taint and what course of action redresses an injury.
The existing circuit split tasks a defendant in the Sixth Circuit with proving
actual prejudice, while a defendant in the Fourth or Seventh Circuit presumes
it. The advent of the digital age amplifies this disparity, thereby creating
greater impetus for courts to control the flow of information in and out of the
jury box.
By orienting where in the sandbox courts reside when initiating their
analyses, courts can better pinpoint the rights and procedural safeguards that
flow from Supreme Court case law. As previously discussed, the remedy
granted should match the injury sustained.289 Applying that logic to types of
jury taint, this section disassembles jury taint into three smaller categories
distinguished by the types of intrusion they pose to a trial’s fairness and a
defendant’s rights in the digital age. The three main lenses are: jury
tampering, which includes third-party inducements or threats intended to
alter the verdict; outside influence, which includes third-party actions not
intended to affect the verdict; and internal misconduct, which includes
inappropriate juror conduct.
286. See Judiciary Preparedness for Coronavirus (COVID-19), U.S. CTS. (June 3, 2020),
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2020/03/12/judiciary-preparedness-coronavirus-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/5BKV-K3DD].
287. Matt Reynolds, Could Zoom Jury Trials Become the Norm During the Coronavirus
Pandemic?, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (May 11, 2020, 8:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/web/
article/could-zoom-jury-trials-become-a-reality-during-the-pandemic
[https://perma.cc/
PC38-NGCQ].
288. Judiciary Preparedness for Coronavirus (COVID-19), supra note 286 (noting a
preference for postponing criminal trials until after the pandemic concludes); Reynolds, supra
note 287 (raising concerns about due process and an impartial jury).
289. See supra Parts III.A–C (analyzing how the three proposed categories classify what
injury deserves what remedy).
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1. Jury Tampering
Jury tampering is the most sinister of intrusions because it reflects a covert
desire to tip the judicial scales to favor one party. It directly threatens the
core of the judicial process, and it “cuts to the heart of the Sixth
Amendment[].”290 It conjures images of insidious characters who slip money
through handshake agreements or approach vulnerable jurors on their
commutes home.
Applying the reasoning of both Remmer and Olano, third-party contact
intended to influence the verdict is presumptively prejudicial. It directly
implicates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right because the intended
outcome proactively seeks to alter the jury’s verdict. Regardless of whether
a case is brought on direct appeal or as a collateral attack, injury to the Sixth
Amendment right evidences a sufficient intrusion to grant the defendant
relief. Thus, where a court faces credible allegations of jury tampering, the
presiding court should grant the defendant a Remmer hearing and presume
prejudice.
2. Outside Influence
But what happens when a third party influences the jury without intending
to? Contact in this category especially blurs the lines between tampering and
innocuous contact, ultimately underscoring the importance of first
identifying the intrusion and its impact on the verdict. As technology lowers
many of the procedural hurdles implemented to insulate juries, courts must
adjust how they define possible types of taint. In today’s twenty-four-hour
news cycle, jurors can never truly shield themselves from outside influence.
A coworker or family friend may innocently refer to an ongoing story or news
coverage about the case, or the juror may overhear information regarding the
case while commuting. There are endless possibilities for how extraneous
information may unintentionally seep into a juror’s routine.
Recognizing where Olano instructs the proper procedure is integral to
crafting a proportionate response. While some outside contact may per se
taint the verdict, as in Parker and Turner,291 other types may not. Olano’s
flexible standard permits courts to adjust their calculus by balancing the
likelihood of prejudice to the defendant with the remedial measures it
assigns. Accordingly, a fact-intensive inquiry best equips courts to
differentiate between meritorious and nonmeritorious allegations of outside
influence.
3. Internal Juror Misconduct
Juror misconduct has become the biggest blind spot of Remmer’s rule.292
As the doctrinal lens largely focuses on preventing outside-in contact, it
290. United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001).
291. See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
292. See supra Part II (discussing the circuit split).
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cannot fully account for what happens when a jury self-infects. What good
is fortifying the exterior when jurors themselves are capable of precipitating
the taint? As circuits have largely disagreed on how to apply Remmer to
instances of juror misconduct, clearly defining its borders and procedure
remains a crucial concern. Again, Olano’s flexible standard is particularly
instructive for diagnosing potential misconduct. That said, the first step is
recognizing that juror misconduct squarely falls within Remmer’s rule293—
especially as the possibility for misconduct looms.
4. Protecting the Sixth Amendment
The different standards by which circuits evaluate jury taint ultimately
entitle defendants to varying degrees of constitutional protection at trial. The
Sixth Amendment promises each criminal defendant the right to an impartial
jury. Yet, divergent applications of Remmer’s rule call into question what is
meant by “impartial.” What one circuit determines to have infringed on the
Sixth Amendment may not trigger the same response in a different circuit.294
Consequently, a defendant’s right to contest proceedings rests largely on
how that jurisdiction perceives outside information to influence them. As
advancing technology makes access to information more readily available,
safeguarding defendants’ Sixth Amendment rights becomes harder and more
important. Resolving Remmer’s rule clarifies what intrusions impinge on
juror impartiality, thereby better protecting Sixth Amendment interests.
CONCLUSION
In 1954, the Court first established that a prima facie case of jury tampering
presumes prejudice to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial.
Over the almost forty years following, the Court developed its framework by
defining criteria for lower courts to utilize when identifying potential
intrusions on that right and, once detected, by supplying instructions to
redress them. Circuit courts are split over how they interpret these
foundational cases, and they ultimately contemplate them as contradictory
instead of complementary. Further, circuits’ varying treatment of habeas
corpus has overlaid the existing split with even more ambiguity.
By broadening and reframing how courts assess jury taint, however, courts
can harmonize the case law. Remmer established a defendant’s right to an
evidentiary hearing. Years later, Olano expanded courts’ investigatory
discretion by permitting them to either presume prejudice, as the Court did
in Remmer, or to conduct a special analysis. Phillips reiterated a defendant’s
293. See generally United States v. Lawson, 677 F.3d 629 (4th Cir. 2012) (reversing a
conviction when a juror used Wikipedia to define the offense at issue); United States v. BristolMartir, 570 F.3d 29 (1st Cir. 2009) (ordering a new trial after a juror admittedly researched
the crime online).
294. Compare Lawson, 677 F.3d at 636 (finding that juror research triggered Remmer’s
presumption and ultimately reversing the conviction), with United States v. Hawley, 660 F.
App’x 702, 709 n.9 (10th Cir. 2016) (declining to investigate allegations of juror misconduct
because the court only applies Remmer to third-party contact with the jury).
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right to a hearing, and it instructed courts to find actual prejudice before
contemplating a mistrial, vacating a conviction, or granting a writ of habeas
corpus.
As technology advances, juries become more susceptible to outside
influence, and the circuit split deepens. Consequently, defendants receive
varying degrees of constitutional protection depending on where they stand
trial. Adopting new standards and categories permits courts to holistically
evaluate modern contaminants while also protecting defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights to an impartial jury.

